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Understanding God Incarnate 
THOMAS V. MORRIS 
The doctrine of the Incarnation is the central Christian 
conviction that the man Jesus of Nazareth was and is God 
Incarnate , the Second Person of the divine Trinity, God the Son, a 
properly divine individual, in human nature. In Jesus, we are 
confronted by one person in two natures, human and divine. Since 
being formulated carefully at the Council of Chalcedon in 45 l A.O. , 
the two-natures view of Christ has served as a cornerstone of 
Christian faith through all subsequent centuries, up until the 
present day. But like many other fundamental, traditional 
Christian convictions, in recent years it has undergone a barrage of 
severe criticism and has become a focus of widespread controversy. 
A great deal of that controversy has arisen in England where on 
occasion it seems that nearly everyone with an education and a 
typewriter has a penchant for theological disputation. Recall for 
example the publicity surrounding Bishop John Robinson's book 
Honest to God, whose publication in 1963 set off an explosion of 
reviews, response articles and letters to the editors of professional 
journals, popular magazines and newspapers. In 1977, the 
publication of The Myth of God Incarnate, edited by John Hick, 
had the same sort of result, generating and focusing much of the 
controversy that currently surrounds the doctrine of the 
Incarnation . Within months of its appearance, The Myth of God 
Incarnate was answered by another collection of essays entitled The 
Truth of God Incarnate. This soon was followed by another book 
The Myth/ Truth of God Incarnate, and another called simply God 
Incarnate, with one more entitled Incarnation and Myth: The 
Debate Continued hot on its heels, and so on, and so on. 
In America, it seems that the only religious controversy we have 
had even approaching these dimensions is the evolution-creation 
debate, and that has attained its level of publicity only because of 
the practical and legal questions of what should be taught in the 
schools. In general, we have tended to keep our disputes in 
philosophical theology modestly confined to a few professional 
journals. However, the recent attacks on Christian orthodoxy now 
threaten to enter the popular press and the pubic arena on this side 
of the Atlantic as well. To illustrate this let me quote from, of all 
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things, a diet book published by a popular American press a few 
months ago, with the rather ambitious subtitle How to Lose Weight 
and Change the World. Paging through this little book in a 
shopping mall bookstore, I found sandwiched between chapters on 
fat and roughage the statement: 
Christian dogma contains a number of flagrant contradictions, 
such as: that the same thing is both one and three things (the 
Trinity) ... and that something can be both human and divine 
(Christ).1 
Now, how such a claim finds its way into a diet book I won' t 
linger to explain. But let me comment on the specific charge that 
this author, in common with many others, makes; the charge that 
there is something logically or conceptually wrong with the 
doctrine of the Incarnation. In particular I want to examine the 
structure of that charge, sketch out one defensive strategy fo r 
turning it back, and then outline two interestingly diffe rent 
attempts to explicate the doctrine coherently by elaborating on the 
metaphysics of the Incarnation. 
The charge of flagrant contradiction, or, more cautiously, of 
incoherence, or even more cautiously yet, the charge of 
metaphysical impossibility, has been repeated in various forms 
quite often in recent years by critics of the doctrine of the 
Incarnation. Basically, the sort of argument most of them seem to 
have in mind is roughly something like the following: On a 
standard and traditional conception of deity, God is omnipotent, 
omniscient, incorporeal, impeccable and necessarily existent, among 
other things. Moreover, by our definition of "God," such 
properties as these are, so to speak, constitutive of deity--it is 
impossible that any individual be divine, or exemplify divinity, 
without having these properties. To claim some individual to be 
divine without being omnipotent, say, or necessarily existent , 
would be on this view just as incoherent as supposing some 
individual to be both a bachelor and married at one and the same 
time. By contrast, we human beings seem clearly to exemplify the 
logical complement (or "opposite") of each of these constitutive 
divine attributes. We are limited in power, restricted in 
knowledge, embodied in flesh, liable to sin and are contingent 
creations. Jesus is claimed in the doctr ine of the Incarnation to 
have been both fully human and fully divine. But it is logicall y 
impossible for any being to exemplify at one and the same time 
both a property and its logical complement. Thus, recent c rit ics 
have concluded, it is logically impossible for any one person to be 
both human and divine, to have all the attributes proper to deity 
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and all those ingredient in human nature as well. The doctrine of 
the Incarnation on this view is an incoherent theological 
development of the early church which must be discarded by us in 
favor of some other way of conceptualizing the importance of Jesus 
for Christian faith. He could not possibly have been God 
Incarnate, a literally divine person in human nature. 
As I have addressed this challenge to the doctrine of the 
Incarnation in great detail elsewhere, in The Logic of God 
Incarnate, I shall give only a relatively brief indication here of how 
it can be answered.2 A lengthy response is not required in order 
for us to be able to see how this currently popular sort of objection 
can be turned back. A couple of very simple metaphysical 
distinctions will provide us with the basic apparatus for def ending 
orthodoxy against this charge, which otherwise can seem to be a 
very formidable challenge indeed. 
As it usually is presented, the sort of argument I have just 
outlined treats humanity and divinity, or human nature and divine 
nature, as each constituted by a set of properties individually 
necessary and jointly sufficient for exemplifying that nature, for 
being human, or for being divine. Such an argument most often 
depends implicitly on a sort of essentialist metaphysic which has 
been around for quite awhile, and which recently has experienced a 
resurgence of popularity among philosophers. On such a view, 
objects have two sorts of properties, essential and accidental. 
Roughly speaking, a property can be essential to an object in either 
of two ways. It is simply part of an individual's essence if the 
individual which has it could not have existed without having it. It 
is a kind-essential property if its exemplification is necessary for 
an individual's belonging to a particular kind, for example, human-
kind. Human nature, then, consists in a set of properties severally 
necessary and jointly sufficient for being human. And the same is 
true of divine nature. The critic of the Incarnation begins with the 
simple truth that there are many properties humans have which 
God could not possibly have, goes on to assume that these 
properties, or at least some of them, are essential properties of 
being human, properties without which no one could be fully 
human, and then concludes that no divine being could possibly 
become a human being. The conclusion would be well drawn if 
the assumption was correct. But it is this assumption we must 
question. 
Once a distinction between essential and accidental properties is 
accepted, a distinction employed in this sort of argument against 
incarnation, another simple distinction follows in its wake. Among 
properties ordinarily characterizing human beings, some are 
essential elements of human nature, but many just happen to be 
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common human properties without also being essential. Consider 
for example the property of having ten fingers. It is a common 
human property, one possessed by a great number of people, but it 
clearly is not a property essential to being human. People lose 
fingers without thereby ceasing to be human. Further, consider a 
common property which safely can be said to be a universal human 
property, one had by every human being in history--the property 
of living at some time on the surface of the earth. Obviously this 
is not an essential human property either. It is clearly possible that 
at some time in the future, human beings be born, live and die on 
a space station, or on another planet colonized by earth, without 
ever setting foot on the earth itself. So it is not a safe inference to 
reason simply from a property's being common or even universal 
among human beings that it is an essential human property, str ictly 
necessary for exemplifying human nature. 
The relevance of this distinction to the doctrine of the 
Incarnation should be obvious . It is certainly quite common fo r 
human beings to lack omnipotence, omniscience, necessary 
existence, and so on. I think any orthodox Christian will agree 
that, apart from Jesus, these are even universal features of human 
existence. Further, in the case of any of us who do exemplify the 
logical complements of these distinctively divine attributes, it may 
well be most reasonable to hold that they are in our case essential 
attributes. I, for example, could not possibly become omnipotent. 
As a creature, I am essentially limited in power. But why think 
this is true on account of human nature? Why think that any 
attributes incompatible with deity are elements of human natu re, 
properties without which one could not be truly or fully human? 
It's important here to draw another distinction. An individual is 
fully human just in case that individual has all essential human 
properties, all the properties composing basic human nature. An 
individual is merely human if he has all those properties plus so me 
additional limitation properties as well, properties such as that of 
lacking omnipotence, that of lacking omniscience, and so on. 
It is the claim of orthodox Christology that Jesus was fully 
human without being merely human. He had all properties strictly 
constitutive of human nature, but also had higher properties as 
well, those properties distinctively constitutive of deity. What is 
crucial to realize here is that an orthodox Christian perspective on 
human nature will just categorize all human properties logically 
incompatible with a divine incarnation as, at most , essential to 
being merely human, or, more exactly, as individually-esse ntial , not 
kind-essential, properties of those of us who are merely human. 
No orthodox theologian has ever held that Jesus was merely human, 
only that he was fully human. It is held that the person who was 
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God Incarnate had the full array of attributes essential to 
humanity, and all those essential to divinity. 
I am suggesting that, armed with a few simple distinctions, the 
orthodox Christian can clarify his conception of human nature in 
such a way as to provide for the coherence and metaphysical 
possibility of the traditional doctrine of the Incarnation. But I am 
sure it will be objected by many that to use these distinctions to 
explicate what Chalcedon and the rest of the church has had in 
mind about Jesus is to land oneself in some well-known absurdities. 
On the Chalcedonian picture, it seems, Jesus was omniscient, 
omnipotent, necessarily existent and all the rest, as well as being an 
itinerant Jewish preacher. But this has appeared outlandish to most 
contemporary theologians. Did the bouncing baby boy of Mary 
and Joseph direct the workings of the cosmos from his crib? Was 
this admittedly remarkable man, as he sat in a boat or under a fig 
tree, actually omnipresent in all of creation? Did this carpenter's 
son exist necessarily? These apparent implications of orthodoxy 
can sound just too bizarre for even a moment's consideration, 
despite any amount of what critics often see as no more than 
metaphysical magic, or hypostatic hocus-pocus, we might engage in 
to save the doctrine. 
At this point we face two distinct problems. First, it may be 
difficult to imagine how anyone could be genuinely human from 
first to last while exemplifying the full array of divine attributes. 
It may be just simply beyond belief that such an individual would 
share the human condition. Second, when we study the biblical 
portrayal of Christ, we do find ourselves presented with an 
extraordinary individual, but as a matter of fact the Jesus of the 
Gospels seems not to have been exemplifying all those impressive 
divine attributes. Was he omnipotent? He grew tired. 
Omniscient? On at least one occasion he indicated there was 
something he did not know. Omnipresent? At one time he was in 
Jericho; at another time in Jerusalem. He walked from one place 
to another. 
By means of the sorts of distinctions I have already sketched 
out, we can def end the orthodox doctrine of the Incarnation against 
direct charges of logical inconsistency. But we need much more 
than this if we are to make sense of the doctrine, if we are to 
come to any significant understanding of what it could mean for 
Jesus to be God Incarnate. What we are forced to consider is 
whether an account of the Incarnation can be provided which will 
on the one hand recognize Christ as a properly divine being in 
accordance with conciliar orthodoxy, and yet on the other hand 
clearly allow his earthly sojourn a genuinely human quality, such as 
what we find portrayed in the Gospels. I want to present the 
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outlines of two very different attempts to provide such an account, 
and along the way indicate some of my own grounds for preferring 
one to the other. 
In the nineteenth century a view was developed which has come 
to be known as "kenoticism" (from kenosis, the Greek word for 
emptying; see Philippians 2:5-8). The central claim of kenotic 
christology is that in order to enter the earthly stream of human 
life, God the Son voluntarily and temporarily laid aside, or emptied 
himself of, all those metaphysical attributes of deity which 
otherwise would preclude such an incarnation. Some people 
understand kenoticism to involve the claim that the Son gave up all 
the distinctively metaphysical attributes of deity for his time among 
us, while yet retaining all the moral qualities which are properly 
divine. But of course it is just impossible that all the me taphysica l 
attributes of deity be temporarily laid aside. No individual could 
possibly cease to be eternal, or immutable, or necessarily existent, 
for a brief period of time, not even a being with the most 
astounding powers of self-limitation. But it can be argued in 
defense of a kenotic christology that the kenotic maneuver need 
not be applied to these properties. For example, relying on the 
distinction between common and essential human properties, and 
the distinction between being fully human and being merely 
human, we can argue (I think, quite plausibly) that the properties 
of coming into existence at some time (a contrary of eternality) and 
contingency (the contradictory of necessity) are just not kind-
essential properties for being fully human. Thus, the individual 
who was Jesus could have been both necessary and eternal in bas ic 
metaphysical status while taking on the nature of a full y human 
being. Furthermore, there are construals of divine immutability 
which will allow the possibility of a divine incarnation, although 
none of them will allow a movement of kenosis with respect to 
immutability itself. But this is unnecessary anyway, since on the 
sort of understanding of immutability clearly compatible with a 
divine incarnation, God the Son could perfectly well retain his 
proper immutability while yet exemplifying the fullness of human 
nature. In short, it can be argued that, armed with the distinctions 
we have drawn concerning human nature, we can see that any 
divine attributes which do not allow of kenosis do not require it 
either in order to be compatible with an incarnation into human 
nature. 
But I need to say something about how Jesus' hav ing these 
kenotically recalcitrant metaphysical attributes need not have any 
absurd implications for orthodoxy. First, it is an ancient, and 
independently plausible, claim that no person is strictly identical 
with his body. Even a modern materialist who holds that all 
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personality is necessarily embodied need not deny this. So the 
necessary existence of God the Son, with its implications that He 
cannot have begun to exist and cannot cease to exist, and therefore 
is eternal, does not entail that the earthly body in which He 
incarnated Himself had these properties. His body was conceived, 
and grew like any other human body. Likewise, the kenotic 
theologian must hold, a person is not identical with any particular 
range of conscious experience, or any particular set of belief states, 
he might have . So the eternality of God the Son need not entail 
the comprehensive continuity of His cognitive states from His pre-
incarnate mode of existence as God into His earthly childhood. 
The kenotic theologian thus allows that the earthly mind-set, along 
with the earthly body, came into existence and grew. Nothing 
about the necessity, eternality or immutability (in a sense to be 
explicated) of the divine Son need preclude this. 
It is a standard kenotic claim that God the Son temporarily gave 
up His omniscience for the course of the earthly stage of the 
Incarna tion. From all eternity, He had been omniscient. For 
roughly three decades He was not. But upon His Ascension, and 
for all eternity future, He continues now to enjoy that maximal 
noetic state once again. This is the kenotic story about God the 
Son's knowledge. Clearly, it allows both the orthodox claim that 
Jesus was God, and the biblical claim that He grew in wisdom as a 
child. 
It is fairly easy to explicate coherently the kenotic allegation that 
the Son voluntarily and temporarily gave up His omniscience, later 
to regain it. For consider Shorty, a spy who is going on a 
dangerous mission in which he will have to pretend to be a great 
scientist with amnesia. So that he will not succumb to questioning 
under torture if suspected, Shorty is given a limited- amnesia 
producing pill, and an antidote for later use. Clearly, such a 
scenario seems perfectly coherent. And in relevant respects it 
parallels the kenotic claim about Christ. 
Temporarily failing to exemplify the property of omniscience 
thus seems, at least so far, to be a possibility. But what of 
omnipotence and omnipresence? Perhaps the best understanding of 
the attribute of omnipresence is that of its being the property of 
being present everywhere in virtue of knowledge of and power 
over any and every spatially located object. A divine being would 
then presumably divest himself of that attribute by divesting 
himself of the requisite power or knowledge. Omnipotence, 
however, may not so simply fit into the kenotic scheme. It, like 
immutability, is what we might call an internally modalized 
attribute. Being omnipotent is, very roughly, being able (having 
the power) to do anything it would be logically possible (in the 
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broadly logical sense) for a maximally perfect being to do. Now, 
let us attempt to describe a case of fully voluntary kenosis with 
respect to this property. A being, S, is omnipotent from ti to t2, 
voluntarily divests himself of this property from t3 to t5, and 
regains it at t6. What exactly is the state of S's power or abilities 
at t4 , during the period of kenosis? If the state of kenosis is 
entirely and thoroughly voluntary, at t4 S has the ability (an ability 
which he freely refrains from exercising) to re-exempt if y 
omnipotence. But at t4, if S can be such that he can do anything 
logically possible for a maximally perfect being, then at that time 
he can do anything logically possible for such a being--in other 
words, it seems he is still omnipotent. If he cannot at t4 take up 
his omnipotence again , he is not in a state of the thoroughly 
voluntary, temporary relinquishing of it. 
If the kenotic theologian is committed to the complete 
voluntariness of the state of the Incarnation, he thus may not be 
able to hold that God the Son temporarily ceased to be omnipotent. 
But if the Son then lacked at least omniscience, one piece of 
knowledge He may be said to have lacked is the knowledge of His 
being omnipotent. And anyone who has restricted his knowledge 
of the range of his own power may be argued thereby to have 
restricted the exercise of his power, since, presumably, no one 
usually draws on resources he does not believe he has. 
By maneuvers such as this, kenoticism can attempt to explain 
how it is that: 
l. Omniscience, omnipotence and omnipresence are properly 
divine attributes; 
2. Jesus was divine as well as human; but, 
3. During the decades of His time among us on earth, this 
individual appeared to have none of these attributes. 
The kenotic strategy has had many critics, but most of them have 
failed to appreciate the subtleties of a limited kenotic picture with 
elements such as these. When combined with the distinctions we 
have drawn concerning human nature, the kenotic maneuver 
applied to the attribute of omniscience alone can appear to go a 
significant way toward ridding orthodoxy of any apparently absurd 
implications. 
I do not, however, find the traditional kenotic strategy full y 
plausible, or even very attractive. I'll mention here only a couple 
of problems I think it faces. First, given any traditional and 
standard analysis of the divine attributes, kenoticism requires a 
general view of the modalities of those attributes which is less than 
fully satisfactory. Second, on the same condition, it necessitates 
abandoning any plausible, substantive metaphysical ascription of 
immutability to God, of even a quite moderate form. 
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The first point about modality is this. As I mentioned earlier, it 
is a fairly standard theistic view that there are properties essential 
to being God, attributes which can be considered to be constitutive 
of deity. Omnipotence and omniscience are clear and relatively 
uncontroversial as examples of such properties. It is impossible, on 
this view, for an individual to be God, or to be literally divine, 
without being omnipotent and omniscient. Many orthodox theists, 
in particular many of those who endorse an Anselmian conception 
of God , go further and hold that omnipotence, omniscience and the 
other attributes constitutive of deity form not only something like 
the kind- essence of deity, but also serve as components of the 
individual-essence of any being who is God. Moreover, many also 
go on to hold the even more stringent and exalted view that no 
individual can possibly count as God unless it is essentially 
possessed of maximal power, and likewise for the other attributes 
constitutive of deity. On this view, there is a collection of 
attributes an individual must have, and must have essentially, in 
order to be strictly, literally divine. 
It should be clear that on this modally exalted view of deity, 
divine kenosis as I have explicated it so far would be an 
impossibility. No individual can give up temporarily a property he 
has essentially. If any being who is divine must have all the 
metaphysically distinctive attributes of deity essentially, none of 
them could be given up by him temporarily, while he yet 
continued to exist. If omniscience is an essential property of God 
the Son, He could not have given it up temporarily. If it is merely 
a requisite of deity, but not a part of His individual essence, He 
could have given it up, but He would thereby have ceased to be 
God. So the earthly period of the Incarnation would not, after all, 
have presented us with an individual with the two natures of 
humanity and divinity simultaneously. On either understanding of 
the modal status of omniscience, the traditional kenotic strategy as 
so far presented cannot be used to explicate and defend the 
orthodox doctrine of the Incarnation. 
Now consider for a moment the ascription of immutability to 
God. A number of prominent theists throughout history have 
understood God's immutability to be the property of being 
absolutely incapable of undergoing or engaging in any sort of real 
change whatsoever. It's obvious that this extreme sort of 
immutability would disallow the possibility of a divine kenosis. 
But what is important to note is that even moderate construals of 
immutability would render kenosis impossible. Consider, for 
example, the conception according to which divine immutability 
consists in simply the impossibility of any individual's beginning to 
have or ceasing to have any of the attributes distinctive of deity, 
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such as omnipotence or omniscience. Such a conception is 
moderate in that it allows many sorts of change in the case of God, 
but it is nonetheless a conception of divine immutability because it 
disallows the possibility of basic change with respect to the 
exemplification of the distinctively divine attributes. This is a 
view I think many traditional theists, including Christian theists, 
would endorse, and it is also a view which rules out the kenotic 
strategy for def ending the doctrine of the Incarnation, at least in 
its standard form. So again at this point, traditional kenotic 
christology is incompatible with a view which is otherwise very 
attractive to theists. 
But why accept any of these views about the modal status of the 
divine attributes? It has been suggested by some very traditional, 
conservative theists that these modal claims are untrue. Stephen 
Davis, for example, has claimed to see no reason to think that 
omniscience is necessary for being divine. Other philosophers have 
suggested that on a certain view of the Trinity, the divine persons 
may differ in the modal status of their attributes; for example, it 
could be that God the Father is essentially omniscient, and that 
God the Son exemplifies that property only contingently, being 
capable of ceasing to have it for a while. If we make less than the 
most modally exalted claims for deity, the standard kenotic strategy 
will be a live option for displaying the coherence of the 
Incarnation and explicating some of its features. But it seems to 
me that there are plausible grounds of an Anselmian sort to make 
such strong modal claims for deity as those I have mentioned. If 
such claims clearly prohibited an incarnation, I would join Davis 
and others in relinquishing them. For any Anselmian intuitions on 
which they are ultimately based are after all def easible. But I am 
inclined to think that these modally maximal claims can be made 
for God and can be reconciled quite well with the evident facts of 
the career of Jesus that kenoticism tries to accommodate. If I can 
go some distance toward showing this, I can thereby provide some 
reason for thinking that the modal background of standard 
kenoticism represents at least an unnecessary weakening of the 
claims many traditional theists otherwise want to make about God. 
I want to sketch out an alternative to kenoticism which accords 
with a modally exalted conception of deity. It is a perspective 
which may even comport with the most extreme understanding of 
divine immutability, if that construal is compatible with any divine 
agency in a world such as ours. It is clearly a perspective which 
stands fully consistent with the more moderate version of divine 
immutability most theists are prepared to endorse. In many ways it 
seems to me to offer a picture, or model, of the Incarnation which 
is superior to that provided by a kenotic view. The view I want to 
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present can be called, succinctly, if possibly somewhat 
misleadingly, " the two-minds view of Christ." It is an ancient 
view which has been relatively neglected for a long time. I believe 
some distinctively modern perspectives can be drawn upon to 
explicate it and display its plausibility. 
Recall first of all a claim needed for kenoticism, the claim that 
no person is identical with any particular range of conscious 
experience, or collection of belief states, he might have. I think 
that the truth of this claim will follow from any modally plausible 
and metaphysically careful account of what a person is. With this 
in mind, we can begin to appreciate the early view that in the case 
of God Incarnate, we must recognize something like two distinct 
ranges of consciousness. There is first what we can call the eternal 
mind of God the Son with its distinctively divine consciousness, 
whatever that might be like, encompassing the full scope of 
omn1sc1ence. And , in addition, there is a distinctly earthly 
consciousness which came into existence and grew and developed as 
the boy Jesus grew and developed. It drew its visual imagery from 
what the eyes of Jesus saw, and its concepts from the languages he 
learn ed. The earthly range of consciousness, and self-
consciousness, was thoroughly human, Jewish and first century 
Palestinian in nature. 
We can view the two ranges of consciousness (and, analogously, 
the two noetic structures encompassing them) as follows: The divine 
mind of God the Son contained, but was not contained by, His 
earthly mind, or range of consciousness. That is to say, there was 
what can be called an asymmetric accessing relation between the 
two minds. Think, for example, of two computer programs or 
informational systems, one containing but not contained by the 
other. The divine mind had full and direct access to the earthly, 
human experience being had through the Incarnation, but the 
earthly consciousness did not have such full and direct access to the 
content of the over-arching omniscience proper to the Logos; only 
such access, on occasion, as the divine mind allowed it to have. 
There thus was a metaphysical and personal depth to the man Jesus 
lacking in the case of every individual who is merely human. 
This account allows for the apparent intellectual and spiritual 
growth of Jesus in His humanity to be a real development. And 
when it is used in connection with the distinctions we have drawn 
concerning human nature, we have in principle a full and adequate 
account of the basic features of the metaphysics of the Incarnation. 
In particular, this view allows us to avoid the absurdities to which 
orthodoxy has always seemed vulnerable. On it, we have in the 
person of Jesus no case of a God merely dressed up as a man. We 
have an individual who is fully human, and who shares in the 
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human condition, experiencing the world in a human perspective. 
No docetic absurdities are implied by the view. Nor is it 
Nestorian. Nor Appolinarian. There is one person with two 
natures, and two ranges of consciousness. He is not the theological 
equivalent of a centaur, half God and half man. He is fully 
human, but not merely human. He is also fully divine. 
The two-minds view seems to me, further, to be a clear 
improvement over standard kenoticism. When He became a man, 
God the Son did not give up anything of deity, He merely took on 
the nature and condition of humanity. We can capture full well 
the New Testament claim that in the Incarnation, God the Son 
humbled Himself, without following keno tic christology in holding 
that He gave up any metaphysical attributes distinctive of deity. 
His humbling consisted rather in His rendering Himself vulnerable 
to the pains, sufferings, aggravations and agonies which became 
His as a man but which, in His exclusively divine form of 
existence, could not have touched Him this way. It is not by virtue 
of what He gave up, but in virtue of what He took on, that He 
humbled Himself. This sort of divine kenosis was a feature of the 
Incarnation, but so understood, it is a f ea tu re which accords 
logically with strong claims concerning the modality and 
immutability of the attributes distinctive of, and traditionally held 
to be constitutive of deity. No kenotic move with any of those 
attributes is required for ridding orthodoxy of any appearance of 
absurdity. 
But can we really understand what it is to attribute two minds, 
or two ranges of consciousness, to one person? That depends on 
what is required for understanding the claim. Can we know what 
it is like to be a God-man? Well, can we know what it is like to 
be a bat? It is hard, if possible at all, to imagine what a sonar-
consciousness is like. Likewise, we do not, and cannot, know what 
it is like to be God, at least not in the way we know what it is like 
to be a human being. It is no objection to my suggestions that it is 
impossible in this sense to know what it would be like to be a 
God-man with two related but distinct ranges of consciousness. 
But as a matter of fact, we can fill out some significant level of 
understanding concerning the claim by way of some analogies. 
I have suggested already a computer or artificial intelligence 
analogy. Consider two or three others. First, an interesting, and 
interestingly parallel, dream phenomenon is reported by many 
people. It is an experience I think I have had myself on more than 
one occasion. The dreamer is having a dream with a large cast of 
characters. The dreamer himself is one of those characters, 
pe rceiving the internal environs of the dream and taking part in its 
action "from within." But, at the same time, the dreamer "as 
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sleeper" is somehow aware, in what could be called an overarching 
level of consciousness, that it is just a dream that is going on, in 
which he is playing a role as one of the characters. If in fact there 
is in such an experience a twofold consciousness, one "within" the 
dream, the other "outside" the dream simultaneously, then we 
have, if not a model, then at least an analogy of some value in 
helping us to get some imaginative grip on the two- minds picture 
of the Incarnation. It is possible, though, that in such experiences 
the dreamer is very rapidly alternating between two perspectives. 
And of course this would provide no model or particularly good 
analogy at all. 
Consider the common claim in twentieth-century psychology 
that there are various strata to the ordinary human mind. The 
postulated unconscious, or subconscious, mind would stand in an 
asymmetric accessing relation to the conscious mind somewhat 
parallel to that postulated between the divine consciousness and the 
earthly consciousness of God Incarnate. If modern psychology is 
even possibly right in this postulation, one person can have 
different levels or ranges of mentality. In the case of Jesus, there 
would then be a very important extra depth had in virtue of His 
being divine. 
Finally, there are cases of commissurotomy, multiple personality 
and even hypnosis, in which we are confronted by what seems to 
be, in some significant sense, a single individual human being, one 
person, but one person with apparently two or more distinct 
streams or ranges of consciousness, distinct domains of experience. 
Now, of course, there are philosophers who claim that in many if 
not all cases of multiple, simultaneous ranges of experience 
associated with the stimulation of one human body, the requisite 
conditions are Jacking for judging there to be a single person who 
is the ultimate bearer of the disparate sets of experience. Some 
theorists identify each discrete range of consciousness in the 
commissurotomy patient, and each personality in the case of a 
multiple personality, as a person. Such a claim is less often made 
with respect to different levels of consciousness or divergent 
streams of awareness associated with cases of hypnotism. But, in 
any case, the sort of identification can be argued to be implausible. 
If one troubling, aberrant personality is eliminated therapeutically 
from the behavioral repertoire of someone afflicted with multiple 
personalities, the therapist surely need not see the effect of his 
work as the killing of a person. Moreover, it is plausible, and 
indeed illuminating, to view normal persons as either having or 
even being systems of systems of mentality or experience. And, 
again, if it is even conceivable that one person have, 
simultaneously, such distinct ranges of mentality, we may have 
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here, in at least some of the more unusual cases, vivid, partial 
analogies which can help us to gain some firmer understanding of 
the two-minds view. 
As a matter of fact, in some cases of multiple personality, there 
exists one personality with apparently full and direct knowledge of 
the experiences had, information gathered, and action initiated by 
one or more other personalities, a sort of knowledge which is not 
had by any other personality concerning it. In other words, there 
seem to exist asymmetric accessing relations in such cases 
interestingly, though of course not perfectly, parallel to the sort of 
relation claimed by the two-minds view to hold between the divine 
and human minds of Christ. 
Does the two-minds view then present the Incarnation as a case 
of split-personality on the part of God the Son? And if so, should 
not the recognition of this alone suffice for a rejection of the view 
as an unworthy, demeaning characterization of Christ? Does what 
initially can appear to serve as a partial explication of orthodoxy 
end up amounting to no more than a gross impiety? 
First of all, the reference to some phenomena of multiple 
personality here is intended only to provide a partial analogy for 
some of what the two-minds view claims to be true in the case of 
Christ. It is to have no more than the limited, but hopefully 
helpful, function of providing some understanding of, and 
imaginative grip on, the central elements of the two-minds view. 
It thus is intended to serve the same function as the computer (AI) 
analogy, the dream analogy, and the reference to the classic 
distinction between the conscious and unconscious, or subconscious, 
mind . It is not intended to be a complete modelling of the noetic 
f ea tu res of the Incarnation. 
Furthermore, the analogy or partial parallel is in no way 
demeaning to God the Son. To see this we must ask exactly what 
it is about the phenomena of multiple personality generally which 
renders the state of exhibiting such phenomena a bad state to be in 
for a human being, a state which it would be better to be without. 
The answer is, I think, quite simple. Typical cases of multiple 
personality exhibit two negative features: they are not mental 
states, or arrangements, voluntarily entered into by the person who 
exhibits the phenomena, and they are not mental states, or 
arrangements, conducive to the attainment of goals valuable to the 
person involved. Both these features are, on any orthodox 
deployment of the two-minds views, absent from the case of 
Christ's exemplification of two minds. His taking on of a human 
mind was entirely voluntary. And, given any traditional account of 
the purpose of the Incarnation, it was conducive to, if not in fact 
necessary for, the attainment of goals valuable to God. So it seems 
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to me that we have no reason from this quarter to hesitate using 
whatever parallel phenomena we find in psychologically unusual 
human cases to help us to understand the relevant aspects of the 
Incarnation. 
The two-minds view of Christ allows us to take seriously the 
human limitations of the earthly career of Jesus without incurring 
the metaphysical and modal costs of kenoticism. I believe it is a 
very powerful picture, and that it can be an important ingredient 
in philosophically explicating the orthodox doctrine of the 
Incarnation and def ending it against all forms of the contemporary 
incoherence challenge. 
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